UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

SERIAL NO: 77/344663

MARK: ONE LOVE

77344663

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RESPOND TO THIS ACTION:
http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:
http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm

APPLICANT: Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Limited

CORRESPONDENT'S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:
N/A
CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS:

OFFICE ACTION

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

ISSUE/MAILING DATE:

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

This letter responds to applicant's communication filed on October 9, 2008.

In its response, applicant clarified the nature of its entity, and argued against the examining attorney's likelihood-of-confusion refusal. The entity clarification is acceptable and has been entered. For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 3033511.

SECTION 2(D) - LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3033511. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); *see* TMEP §§1207.01 *et seq.* See the enclosed registration.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. *See* 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The court in *In re E. I. du*

Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). *See* TMEP §1207.01. However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. *In re Majestic Distilling Co.*, 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); *see In re E. I. du Pont*, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods and/or services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services. *See In re Opus One, Inc.*, 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); *In re Dakin's Miniatures Inc.* , 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); *In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 *et seq.*

Taking into account the relevant *du Pont* factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis. The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b). The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. *See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.* , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); *Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.*, 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

Applicant seeks to register "ONE LOVE" for use in connection with "hotel, bar and restaurant services."

The registered mark is "ONE LOVE" for "restaurant services."

Applicant's mark is identical to the registrant's mark.

If the marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties need not be as close to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as might apply where differences exist between the marks. *Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America,* 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), *cert. denied* 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); *In re Opus One Inc.*, 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001); *Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc.*, 210 USPQ 70 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1207.01(a).

In its response, applicant argued that its applied-for mark "is a song by Bob Marley & The Wailers" and "consumers associate ONE LOVE with Applicant and Bob Marley…. Applicant's use of the mark ONE LOVE is suggestive of Bob Marley and his message of global unity."

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, meaning or connotation and commercial impression. *In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find a likelihood of confusion. *In re White Swan Ltd.*, 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); *In re Lamson Oil Co.*, 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1043 (TTAB 1987); *see* TMEP §1207.01(b).

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods and/or services they identify come from the same source. *In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc.*, 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. *See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton*, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); *Visual Info.*

Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. *Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co.*, 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); *Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co.*, 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Here, because applicant's and the registrant's marks are identical, the ordinary consumer would likely be confused into believing that the services come from the same source.

Furthermore, applicant's and the registrant's services are closely related, where not identical, because they are often provided together. See Attachments "hotel" through "hotel3" and "bar" through "bar2" with previous Office action.

In its response, applicant argued that its services are "associated with Bob Marley and his image, his song 'One Love' and his message of global unity," while the registrant's mark is "for a chain of fast-food restaurants, located predominantly in the Southern United States, that sells chicken fingers." Applicant also argued that the pertinent services are "directed to completely different markets and different customers."

Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods and/or services as they are identified in the application and registration. *Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc.*, 281 F.3d 1261, 1267-68, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002); *In re Shell Oil Co.*, 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.4, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

In this case, the registrant's services are identified broadly. Therefore, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers. *In re Elbaum*, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981); *In re Optica Int'l* , 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

Also, when the application describes the services broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, then it is presumed that the application encompasses all services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers. *See In re Melville Corp.*, 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) ("With reference to the channels of trade, applicant's argument that its goods are sold only in its own retail stores is not persuasive . . . . There is no restriction [in its identification of goods] as to the channels of trade in which the goods are sold."); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

As for applicant's argument that its activities are geographically separate from those of registrant, the owner of a registration without specified limitations enjoys a presumption of exclusive right to nationwide use of the registered mark under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), regardless of its actual extent of use. *Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.* , 710 F.2d 1565, 1568, 218 USPQ 390, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Therefore, the geographical extent of applicant's and registrant's activities is not relevant to a likelihood of confusion determination.

The services of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. *See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.*, 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods and/or services come from a common source. *In re Total Quality Group, Inc.*, 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP

§1207.01(a)(i); *see, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc.*, 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); *In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.* , 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The same consumers will be exposed to the services identified with both marks. The similarities between the marks and the services of the parties are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion. The examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark that is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used. *Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc.*, 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); *In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc.*, 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); TMEP §§1207.01(d)(i).

Applicant's mark closely resembles the registrant's mark and the services identified by these marks are closely related. When used in relation to its identified services, applicant's mark may cause confusion or mistake to the ordinary consumers as to the source of such services in relation to the registrant's mark.

Based on the above discussion, the refusal to register applicant's mark is therefore maintained and made **FINAL**.

Although applicant's mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

RESPONSE TO FINAL REFUSAL

If applicant fails to respond to this final action within six months of the mailing date, the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond to this final action by:

(1) submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible (37 C.F.R. §2.64(a)); and/or
(2) filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class (37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18) and 2.64(a); TMEP §§715.01 and 1501 *et seq.*; TBMP Chapter 1200).

In certain circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed to review a final action that is limited to procedural issues, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2). 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). *See* 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b), TMEP §1704, and TBMP Chapter 1201.05 for an explanation of petitionable matter. The petition fee is $100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

If applicant has questions about its application or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.

/Dawn Han/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 107
(571) 272-9432

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received

notification of the Office action via e-mail. For *technical* assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney. **Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses**.

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.